We consider a setting in which consumers experience distinct instances of need for a durable product at random intervals. Each instance of need is associated with a random utility and the consumers are dierentiated according to the frequency with which they experience such instances of need. We use our model of consumer utility to characterize the rm's optimal strategy of whether to sell, rent, or do a combination of both in terms of the transaction costs and consumers' usage characteristics. We nd that the two modes of operation serve dierent roles in allowing the rm to price discriminate. While sales allow the rm to discriminate among consumers of dierent usage frequencies, rentals allow it to discriminate according to consumers' realized valuations. Consequently, even when transaction costs are negligible, it is often optimal for the rm to simultaneously rent and sell its product. In addition, we nd that although sales and rentals are substitutes and that the oering of sales weakly increases rental prices, it is possible that the introduction of rentals to a pure selling operation can either increase or decrease the optimal sales prices.
Introduction
For many durable products that deliver utility over time, consumers derive utility not as a constant ow, but as a series of specic instances of need, each of which may involve a varying amount of potential utility. For example, the parent of a small child may be able to derive a lot of utility from having access to a Pixar video on a day in which he/she needs to work and lacks access to day-care. But on days when he/she is less busy, or has planned an activity with his/her child, this utility may be lower or non-existent. In addition to the fact that the utility obtained by an individual consumer may vary from one specic instance of need for the product to another, we also observe that some consumers experience instances of need for a product more often than do others, i.e., not all children / parents have the same enthusiasm for repeatedly watching that Pixar video. Yet, this description of how consumers derive utility from a product is not unique to a Pixar video. Many other products, including software, databases, as well as traditional durable products, similarly deliver utility stochastically over time according to the realization of specic instances of consumer need.
Per-use rentals have been a way of doing business for many years in construction equipment, medical equipment, and video-entertainment (VCR / DVD) industries where there are signicant costs involved in producing and holding individual units of the product. By renting instead of selling its product, a rm can benet from the eciency that results from higher utilization of the units that it produces. In addition, because renting allows a rm to avoid the externality that creates a self-defeating incentive to reduce its prices over time, renting may help to mitigate the pernicious eects of time inconsistency that have been well-documented in the durable goods literature. However, these virtues of renting are counterbalanced by the fact that in industries in which production / holding costs are signicant, there also tend to be signicant logistical costs involved in transactions. One expects the presence of these transaction costs to be the main driver for a rm to indulge in selling in addition to renting. However, interestingly, we nd that selling allows a rm to price discriminate between its consumers in a manner quite dierent from renting. Specically, selling allows a rm to price discriminate among consumers who vary in terms of their long run expected utility-per-unit-of-time, while renting allows it to price discriminate among the valuations that are realized at a particular instance of time. Thus, even for products with negligible production and transaction costs, for instance, information products such as software, access to databases, entertainment videos, etc., we nd that it can be optimal for a rm to both sell and rent to its consumers.
While the aforementioned price discrimination eects are certainly present in traditional physical product industries, we focus our attention on information products where the price discrimination eects are unclouded by the eects of the trade-o between production and transaction costs. Formally, we study the interplay between selling and renting for a rm that faces negligible marginal production costs and interacts with consumers that experience intermittent instances of need with random valuations. In our model, consumers are dierentiated according to their frequency of use, and the utility that a consumer could obtain from a given instance of need is a random variable. These two features are similar to those used in the durable goods and queuing literatures respectively. In the literature on durable products, it is quite common to allow for consumers to be dierentiated according to the average utility that they derive from a product per unit of time. However, it is nearly always assumed that utility is generated at a constant rate over time, ignoring the fact that for many durables, there is considerable volatility in the amount of utility that a consumer derives from it at distinct instances of time. Similarly, our allowance for a random utility at each instance of need is common in the queueing literature, but typically it is assumed that all consumers share the same usage frequency.
1 The novelty of our model is in combining these two features to obtain an operationally rich model of how consumers derive utility from a durable product that enables us to explore the trade-os between selling and per-use rentals in a way that existing models, either in the queueing or the durable goods literatures, 1 An exception is the paper, Cachon and Feldman [2011] , that considers consumers with two usage rates.
We discuss this paper is greater detail later.
could not.
To demonstrate the distinct roles that are played by renting and selling in a rm's price discrimination strategy, we focus much of our analysis on the case in which the rm can commit to the prices it charges. We characterize the optimal amounts of selling and renting and show that the two are substitutes in the sense that a rm sells and rents less when it oers both options than when it oers either one of them in isolation. However, although rental prices are always higher in the presence of sales, it is possible that sales prices may be either higher or lower when combined with rentals.
We then extend our analysis to the case in which the rm is unable to commit to its future prices. This extension is motivated by well documented ndings from the durable goods literature in which a rm that sells its products experiences the pernicious eects of time inconsistency, i.e., a situation in which consumers' willingness to pay for a product is eroded by their anticipation of the rm's incentive to lower prices over time. Further, this literature nds that these eects, which are detrimental to rm prots, can be eliminated by oering leases. In particular, if transaction costs are negligible, a rm would strictly prefer to lease rather than sell. Our goal herein is to ascertain whether the additional price discrimination made possible by selling would outweigh the impact of time inconsistency that it would induce. Of course per-use rentals are quite dierent from leases because consumers can observe their realized valuations for the product prior to each decision to rent, whereas a lease typically provides longer term access that provides the same value to a consumer perunit of time as does ownership. We nd that even when transaction costs are negligible, a rm will employ both per-use rentals and sales for a wide range of parameters 2 . In addition, we show that the oering of per-use rentals along-side units that are for sale reduces the rm's incentive to lower its selling price over time.
2 Although we do not specically allow for the rm to oer leases alongside both per-use rentals and sales, because a lease endows a consumer with the same benets as ownership and eliminates the rm's incentive to reduce prices over time, a lease oering is equivalent to selling with a commitment to future prices. Therefore, it is obvious that the rm would optimally do no selling, and would employ leasing and per-use renting according to our results for committed price selling and per-use renting in Section 4.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: After presenting a review of the literature in Section 2, we describe our model in Section 3. In Section 4, we analyze the situation in which the rm can commit to its selling and renting prices, and in Section 5, we extend this analysis to the case in which the rm cannot make such a commitment. Finally, we discuss the implications of our results and draw conclusions in Section 6.
Literature Review
Extant literature has studied rms that sell durable goods to consumers or provide access to these goods via rentals. However, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the rst attempt to analyze a system in which consumers can access a durable product either by purchasing it or by renting it per-use. This co-existence provides a rich avenue for studying the interaction between the rm's and consumers' decisions.
Our work is most closely related to the work that has been done on pricing information goods by Essegaier et al. [2002] and Sundararajan [2004] , among others. However, while this literature addresses per-use versus at fee pricing, it tends to assume that consumers are dierentiated according to their marginal utilities for the product without explicitly considering the idea that consumers may derive random valuations from the use of a product each time that they experience a specic instance of need. Consequently, Essegaier et al. [2002] nds that in the absence of capacity constraints a rm should optimally use at fee pricing, which equates to exclusive reliance upon sales in our context. The result obtained by Sundararajan [2004] , that a nonlinear pricing policy can be improved upon by oering an option for unlimited use for a xed fee, bears some resemblance to our result that a rm can benet by including sales in addition to per-use rentals. However, their result depends upon there being positive transaction costs for usage based pricing, and ours does not. More recently, Balasubramanian et al. [2011] develop a model that, like ours, distinguishes between frequency of use and valuation per-use. However, their approach is somewhat dierent than ours. In particular, we assume that the utility that a consumer obtains from each specic instance of need is a random variable, but the distribution of valuations is the same for all consumers and instances of use, whereas they assume that each consumer obtains a constant amount of value from each use, but that consumers are dierentiated according to what this constant value is. In addition, they do not consider the simultaneous oering of rentals and sales as we do. Instead they nd that for a monopolist, per-use rentals generate higher prots for the rm so long as transaction costs are suciently low; for a duopoly setting, they nd that the only equilibrium in which either rm makes positive prots is the one where one rm sells and the other rents.
Our work is also related to the literature on queueing that has implications for managing rental systems. The canonical model considered in these papers consists of consumers arriving stochastically over time and requesting per-use access to a resource. Mendelson and Whang [1990] were the rst to examine social optimality with incentive-compatible pricing in such a system with dierent classes of consumers. Afeche [2007] examines a similar context, but explores revenue, rather that social, maximization. More recently, Cachon and Feldman [2011] compare per-use and subscription pricing in a queueing context. The consumer models used there for per-use and subscription options are quite similar to those that we use for rental and sales options, respectively. In particular, under the rental option, a consumer decides whether to rent after observing the realization of his/her random utility, whereas under the sales option, a consumer decides whether to purchase based on the expected value over all future requirements. Cachon and Feldman [2011] study both modes of operation in isolation and focus most of their attention on a setting in which consumers are homogeneous in their usage rates. In an extension to their basic model, they allow for consumers to be of one of two types: high or low frequency of use. For the case of zero congestion costs and valuations uniformly distributed on an interval that has zero as the lower limit of support, they demonstrate that subscriptions dominate per-use rentals. In contrast, we allow for a more general distributions of valuations and usage frequencies and characterize the optimal combination of per-use rentals and sales (subscriptions) in terms of distributions of valuations and usage frequencies.
There is a large literature that addresses the issue of how a rm's incentives to set prices for a durable good change over time. This issue was rst recognized in the context of rms that sell durable products to an anonymous group of consumers by Coase [1972] , and was later formalized by Bulow [1982] . A number of studies examine the conditions under which anonymous consumers' anticipation of decreasing durable prices over time can be mitigated by leasing instead of selling, e.g. Bucovetsky and Chilton [1986] , Desai and Purohit [1999] , Desai and Purohit [1998] , Bhaskaran and Gilbert [2009] , and Bhaskaran and Gilbert [2005] .
Others examine alternative mitigation strategies when leasing is not possible, such as: underinvesting in durability and/or employing an inecient production technology (Bulow [1986] ), and using intermediaries (Desai et al. [2004] and Arya and Mittendorf [2006] ). Several others consider the dynamics between demand information and a rm's pricing policy. For example, Hart and Tirole [1988] show that when there is either a single consumer or consumers are non-anonymous, then a rm may be better o selling than leasing.
Although we are unaware of any examination of simultaneous per-use rentals and sales within the durable goods literature, Huang and Anderson [2001] demonstrate that transaction costs can explain the co-existence of selling and leasing in a durable goods market.
However, their focus is on leasing, which as previously discussed, is fundamentally dierent from per-use rental. Nor do they consider how the rm's incentives to set prices evolve with the passage of time.
Model
Consider a rm that oers a durable product to consumers by either selling it or by renting it on a per-use basis. Each consumer experiences distinct instances of need for this product over time, and each instance of need involves a single unit of the product and a xed duration of time (equal for all consumers). We propose to represent this situation with a discrete time model in which the length of each period is dened to be the xed duration for which consumers require the product each time they have an instance of need.
We assume that consumers are heterogeneous in terms of the rate at which they experience instances of need for the product, and each consumer experiences an instance of need at most once in a given period. We denote by λ ≤ 1 the usage rate for a consumer, i.e. the probability with which she experiences an instance of need for the product, and assume that λ is distributed over a mass of n consumers according to distribution function, G(λ), with support [0, Λ], where Λ ≤ 1. We denote the corresponding density function as g(λ). To represent the fact that consumers may experience dierent types of instances of need for the product, we denote by V the utility 3 that a consumer would receive from the product for a particular instance of need where V is a random variable with a distribution and density functions F (v) and f (v) on its support [v, v] .
To focus on the key trade-os between the per-use rental and the outright sale, we simplify the rm's capacity decision by assuming that the cost to procure the product is negligible.
This assumption implies that the rm would always have sucient capacity to meet all consumer demand. (In Appendix A.2, we discuss how our main insights extend to the case in which procurement costs are non-negligible.) The rm incurs a cost of c per transaction.
We dene a transaction as an exchange between the rm and the consumer. Thus, the rm incurs a cost of c either when it rents a unit to a consumer for a period or when it sells a unit to a consumer. In fact, both the rm and the consumer incur some costs at the time of transaction. On the rm's side, there are costs associated with providing services, such as preparing and delivering each rented/sold unit, which reduce the rm's prot margin.
On the consumer's side, there may be inconvenience costs associated with accessing the product. We assume that these transaction costs are identical for all consumers and are the same regardless of whether a unit is rented or sold. Without further loss of generality, we 3 Throughout the manuscript, we use the terms valuation and utility interchangeably. absorb both types of costs into a single parameter, c, for transaction costs and assume that this cost is borne by the rm. Note that, although information technology has dramatically reduced transaction costs, it is dicult to think of a situation in which these costs are zero.
Even in the video streaming that serves as our primary motivating example, a consumer still needs to access the internet, nd the rm's web-site, and enter some information before either renting or purchasing. Therefore, we allow for positive transaction costs, but we also analyze the limiting case in which transaction costs approach zero.
The rm's goal is to maximize the net present value of all its future cash ows (from both rentals and sales). Let p t r and p t s be the rental and sales prices in period t, respectively.
The consumers, being rational and strategic, choose their action to maximize the net present value of all their future payos. At the beginning of each period, the market consists of all consumers who have not yet purchased the product. These consumers decide whether to purchase the durable at the current price, p t s . All those consumers who do not purchase consider renting each time that a need arises, and rent only if the realized value of that need exceeds the rental price in that period. To emphasize the fact that purchase decisions are based on consumers' expectations of the value that they derive from the product over time, we assume that consumers make their decision to purchase before they know whether they will experience an instance of need in that period, and if so, what the realized value of that need will be. Similarly, to emphasize that rental decisions are made in response to specic instances of need, we assume that consumers decide to rent only after experiencing an instance of need and observing the realized value V from that need. The rm and its consumers discount future cash ows and utilities with a discount factor of 1 − α, where 0 < α < 1. Specically, $1 earned in period k is worth only (1 − α) k at time 0. Following the conventional assumption in the durable goods literature that the physical life of a durable product is much longer than the time horizon studied, we further assume that the durable good lasts innite time without any quality degradation.
In order to better understand the key trade-os between selling and renting, we begin our analysis in the next section with the baseline case in which the rm can credibly pre-commit to prices. That is, the rm sets the sales and rental price at the beginning of the time horizon, and consumers base their decisions on these prices without the need for any further strategic anticipation. Analyzing this case facilitates our analysis of the case in which the rm is unable to commit to its future prices and consumers anticipate how its incentives change over time.
Analysis under Price Commitment
In this section, we assume that the rm can credibly commit to constant sales and rental prices for the entire time horizon, i.e., the rm chooses its sales and rental prices once at the beginning of the time horizon so that p t r = p r and p It is important to note the distinction between the purchasing and renting payos. The purchase decision is made only once, and is evaluated ex ante before the consumer knows her valuation for each usage instance. However, the decision to rent the product at rental price p r is made ex post after observing the valuation of each particular usage instance.
As shown in Figure 1 , the consumer's expected payo increases linearly in her usage rate regardless of whether she buys or rents, but the rate of increase is larger when the consumer purchases. Without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to purchase prices that result in there being a marginal usage rateλ ∈ [0, Λ], such that a consumer with this usage rate is indierent between purchasing and renting.
4 All consumers with λ ≥λ prefer to purchase the product, while the others prefer to rent. The indierence of the marginal consumer
, which allows us to derive the following relation between the sales price, rental price and the marginal consumer's usage rate: The rm earns prot from both its sales and rental segments. Its prot from the sales segment, which we denote by π s λ , p r , is the following function of the usage frequency of the marginal consumer to whom it sells,λ, and the rental price, p r :
The aggregate expected units of rentals in each period can be expressed as follows:
Thus, the rm's income per period from the rental segment is equal to the product of its rental prot margin (p r − c) and the aggregated rental demand rate λ r . Using the discount factor 1 − α, the net present value of the rm's rental prot, which we denote by π r (λ, p r ),
is:
Dene π c (λ, p r ) to be the net present value of the rm's combined prots from renting and selling, where π c (λ, p r ) = π s (λ, p r ) + π r (λ, p r ). To identify the optimal marginal usage rateλ and the optimal rental price p r , the rm solves the following optimization problem:
(4.5)
To facilitate analysis, we restrict our attention to distributions that have the increasing failure rate (IFR) property. That is, we have d dλ
Note that this is a standard restriction in pricing models to ensure the uniqueness of the optimal solution and is satised by several commonly used distributions, including uniform, normal, beta, and gamma.
For purposes of comparison, it is useful to consider the conditionally optimal linear prices that the rm would set if it were constrained to the exclusive use of either per-use rentals or sales. Let r * s be the rm's optimal selling price under exclusive sales, and let r * r be the optimal per-use rental fee under exclusive rentals. The following result can be obtained from applying rst-order-conditions:
Lemma 4.1. (a) If the rm is constrained to only selling its product, then the optimal selling price is r *
where λ * s is the value of λ s that satises:
( 4.7) (b) If the rm is constrained to only renting its product, then the optimal per-use rental price, r * r , is the value of r r that satises:
(4.10)
Because G has the IFR property, the left hand side of (4.6) is decreasing and is strictly positive at λ = 0. Therefore, so long as Λ ≥ αc/E [V ], there is a unique solution to (4.6) that will maximize π s (λ, p r = v). Otherwise, it is optimal for the rm set the sales price high enough to price even the highest frequency consumer out of the market.
Similarly, the expression in (4.9) represents the rst-order-condition for π r λ = Λ, r r with respect to r r . Here the IFR property of F ensures that (4.9) has a unique solution that maximizes π r λ = Λ, r r if and only if the transaction cost
, v . Otherwise, if c falls below the lower limit of this interval, the rm sets the rental price to v so that even the lowest realized utility for an instance of need is satised. At the other extreme, where c ≥ v, the rm prices even the highest possible realization of utility out of the market.
Let us now turn our attention to the problem that the rm faces when it can simultaneously rent and sell its product. Dening p * r andλ * as the optimal solution to (4.5), the rm's optimal strategy can be characterized as follows:
Theorem 4.2. If the rm can pre-commit to its prices, then: (a)We have p * r < v, so that some rentals will occur, if and only if v > c; (b) There exists a threshold,
, on the maximum usage frequency, such thatλ * < Λ , so that some sales will occur, if and only if Λ > Λ. , then lim c→0 Λ = 0 and lim c→0 λ * < Λ.
The corollary establishes a sucient condition for it to be optimal to sell some units as transaction costs approach zero. Note that this condition is true for all distributions that have zero as the lower limit of support. This result contrasts with the literature, e.g., Essegaier et al. [2002] , Sundararajan [2004] , and Balasubramanian et al. [2011] , in which it is optimal to sell (oer an unlimited use option) only when there are non-negligible capacity or transaction costs. Thus, our result reinforces the notion that selling and renting play distinct roles in a rm's price discrimination strategy. Selling allows us to discriminate among consumers based on their frequency of use, whereas per-use rental allows us to discriminate among the realized utilities for all instances of need that are not satised by the units that have been sold.
The structural properties characterized in Theorem 4.2 are illustrated in Figure 2 where α = 0.1, V is uniformly distributed on [50, 130] , and G follows a uniform distributed on [0, Λ] . To perform the computations, we discretize the distribution for V with a step size of 0.1, and this is why the curve representingλ * in the gure is not smooth. The gure shows which mode of operation is optimal for various pairs of the the maximum usage rate, Λ, and the transaction cost, c. The results shown in the gure are consistent with intuition; we sell only when the maximum usage rate is suciently high, and we rent only when the transaction cost is suciently low.
transaction cost, c maximum consumer usgae frequency, We would like to next understand how the rm's operational exibility to simultaneously engage in selling and renting aects the optimal prices relative to when it can only sell or only rent. To do so, it is helpful to rst consider the conditionally optimal marginal usage rate for a given per-use rental price, denotedλ * (p r ), and the conditionally optimal rental price for a given marginal usage rate, denoted p * r λ for the case in which the rm simultaneously engages in both selling and renting.
Lemma 4.4. The conditionally optimal rental price and marginal usage rate satisfy the following properties: a) p * r λ is decreasing in the marginal consumer's usage rateλ for all
andλ <λ * . b)λ * (p r ) is decreasing in the rental price p r for all
The rst part of this result provides insight about the eect of adding sales to an exclusive rental operation. It states that an increase in sales, which lowers the marginal usage rate, leads to higher rental prices. In the absence of sales, the optimal rental price is driven by the trade-o between the margin per rental and the volume of rentals per consumer.
Although consumers are heterogeneous in usage frequency, they are homogeneous in terms of the distribution of utility that they receive from a given instance of need. Consequently, when the rm only rents, its optimal exclusive rental price, r * r , is independent of the size of the market. If the rm were exclusively renting to a market with maximum usage rate,l, its optimal price would still be r * r . However, because consumers see renting as an alternative to purchasing, the marginal consumer's willingness to pay to purchase the product is increasing in the rental price. This creates an upward pressure on the rental price that does not exist in the rental only operation, and this results in a higher rental price when sales and rentals co-exist than when rentals are oered in isolation. This is formally stated below.
Theorem 4.5. If the rm can pre-commit to its prices and can simultaneously sell and rent, then the optimal per-use rental price will be at least as high as the one that would be set when it can only rent, i.e. p * r ≥ r * r , where the inequality is strict whenλ * < Λ.
The above result highlights the unique role that is played by per-use rentals as a means of expanding the market to include consumers with lower usage frequencies. Because lower usage frequencies correspond to lower potential utility for the product, and the rental option provides a smaller portion of the potential utility than does ownership, it is tempting to think of per-usage rentals as comparable to a low-quality version of the product in a vertically dierentiated product setting. However, in a classical model in which consumers are dierentiated according to their valuation per-unit of quality, e.g., Moorthy [1984] , the introduction of a high-end version of an existing product would cause the optimal price for the existing (low quality) version of the product to decrease, exactly the opposite of what happens to the rental price when sales are introduced. This highlights the fact that the ability to charge consumers for each instance of need is a key ingredient to why per-use rentals can play a unique role in the rm's price discrimination policy.
The second part of Lemma 4.4 provides insight about the eect of adding rentals to an exclusive sales operation. It states that when the rm increases its rental price, then the conditionally optimal marginal usage rate decreases, i.e., the rm will sell to more consumers.
Although this monotonicity result can be conrmed only for p r ∈ [r * r , v], this is the domain of interest since we know from Lemma 4.4(a) that r * r is a lower bound on the optimal rental price. Because the marginal usage rate among purchasing consumers will be higher when the rm oers both sales and rentals than when it exclusively sells (by implicitly setting p r = v),
it is clear that the rm sells fewer units when it also oers rentals. Moreover, because the marginal valuation of a rental consumer is equal to the rental price, and the rental price is higher in the presence of sales, it follows that the rm rents to a smaller portion of the market when it also sells the product. Together, these two observations conrm the intuition that renting and selling are substitutes in the sense that the rm provides less of each of them in combination than when it does either one in isolation.
However, the impact of rentals upon the sales price is a little more complex. In particular, the introduction of rentals to a pure selling operation has two opposing eects. As described above, the introduction of rentals will cause the usage rate that characterizes the marginal purchasing consumer to increase. Because consumers with higher usage rates obtain more value from owning the product, this puts upward pressure on the sales price. However, the introduction of rentals also presents consumers with an alternative to purchasing, which lowers their willingness to pay, and thus places a downward pressure on the sales price. The net impact on the sales price depends on the magnitude of each of these eects and can lead to either an increase or a decrease in the sales price depending on the model parameters.
We provide an illustrative example of this dynamic in Figure 3 where we use the same parameters as in Figure 2 except that we take G(λ) to follow a beta distribution When b > 1 (b < 1), the distribution is skewed towards the low (high) usage rates. We can make two observations from the gure: First, when the distribution of usage rates is skewed signicantly toward the high end, i.e., b = 0.05, the optimal sales price decreases upon the introduction of the rental option whereas for the case b = 0.5, the optimal sales price increases upon introduction of the rental option. Second, we can observe that the sales price set by the rm when it sells and rents the products converges to the sales price in the case in which it only sells as the transaction cost increases. The rst observation is due to the fact that when the usage frequency distribution is skewed more toward high usage consumers, the rm sets a fairly high price when only selling. So, the introduction of rentals oers consumers a much cheaper alternative and the downward pressure on sales price dominates. The second observation makes sense because an increase in transaction cost makes rentals more expensive for the rm and when the transaction cost becomes high enough, the rm ceases renting altogether and its sales price becomes identical to that in the case in which there is no rental option.
General Setting with No Commitment
Until now, we have assumed that the rm can credibly commit to not changing its prices.
However, we frequently observe decreasing price trajectories for products in practice, which is consistent with classical results in the durable good literature. Recall from the conjecture of Coase [1972] and to its later formalization by Bulow [1982] that, consumers' willingness to pay is eroded by their anticipation of a rm's unavoidable temptation to reduce selling prices over time. This eect, which is often referred to as time-inconsistency, can be completely mitigated by leasing, and consequently it is optimal for a durable goods rm to rely exclusively upon leasing. However, nearly all of the durable goods literature implicitly assumes that a leasing consumer makes her decision based on the expectation of her time invariant valuation. In contrast, by focusing on per-use rentals, we allow for consumers to experience specic instances of need, for each of which, the actual valuation from using the product is a random variable. Therefore, consumers who purchase (or lease) a product do so based on the expectation of the valuations that they will receive from the product, whereas consumers who rent do so based on the realized valuations for each instance of need that they experience.
Nevertheless, per-use rentals are similar to leases in the sense that, by relying exclusively on either of them, a rm could completely mitigate the adverse eects of time inconsistency.
Therefore, it is of interest to investigate whether it will continue to be optimal for a rm to sell some units when it cannot pre-commit to its selling price and is subject to the eects of time inconsistency. To do this, we consider a version of the innite horizon problem in which the rm cannot commit to its prices until the end of some nite period t = N , and then we take the limiting case of this problem as N → ∞. We denote the sales and rental prices in period t by p t s and p t r , respectively, and the maximum usage rate among consumers who have not purchased the product by the end of period t by λ t .
Analogous to the commitment case, we nd that a consumer's willingness to pay is increasing in her usage rate. Consequently, the consumer with usage rate λ t is the marginal consumer in period t and the rm's prices make her indierent between purchasing in period t or in period t + 1. Equating her payos from buying in period t with those of buying in period t + 1, we obtain:
, from which we establish the following relationship, which allows us to use the marginal usage rate λ t and the rental price p t r as the rm's decision variables (as in Section 4):
To formalize the rm's optimization problem, let J t (λ t−1 ) be the rm's optimal prot from period t onwards given that the optimal marginal usage rate is λ t−1 in period t − 1.
This prot is obtained by maximizing the discounted prots that the rm earns from period t onward. The rm obtains prot in period t from selling to the consumers with usage rates from λ t to λ t−1 at price p t s and renting at price p t r ≥ c to those with usage rates from 0 to λ t who experience an instance of need with a realized valuation above p t r . Specically, its prot in period t is:
where the sales price, p t s , is dened in (5.1). Using the relationship (5.1), the rm's dynamic program can thus be written as:
Note that the rm commits to xed sales and rental prices in period N for the remainder of the time horizon. Thus, no rational consumer will purchase the product after period N .
Further, the rm's expected rental income in each subsequent period will be identical to that in period N . It then follows that the total expected discounted prot made by the rm period N onward can be directly computed as displayed in (5.4) as the sum of the expected prot made on sales in period N and the expected discounted prot made on rentals period N onward. We are interested in the solution to the problem described in (5.3-5.4) as N grows without bound. Henceforth, we will only consider this limiting problem and denote the trajectory of its optimizers by l * ,t and p * ,t r for t ≥ 1, and the corresponding sales price trajectory by p * ,t s for t ≥ 1.
Recall from Section 4 that selling allows the rm to discriminate between consumers with dierent usage rates. Initially, the maximum usage rate in the residual market is large, so the benet from discrimination is high, which makes it attractive to sell to consumers. As the rm sells to more consumers, the maximum usage rate in the residual market λ * ,t decreases, and thus selling becomes less attractive. Because the support for usage rates is nite, λ * ,t must converge as t → ∞. As it does so, the volume of sales in each period converges to zero, and consequently, both p * ,t s and p * ,t r must also converge. eventually buys a unit, and every consumer with usage rate below λ * ,∞ rents in each period in which her need arises and has a valuation realization greater than the rental price in that period.
Theorem 5.1 states that so long as the maximum usage rate is above a threshold, there will be a positive amount of sales in every period. In contrast to the case where the rm can pre-commit to its sales price, here the rental price converges to the one that would be optimal in an exclusive rental operation. However, as highlighted in the following Corollary, when transaction costs are small, we will avoid selling to everyone eventually if and only if it would be optimal to rent to all valuations in a pure renting operation.
Corollary 5.2. For the limiting case in which transaction costs are arbitrarily small:
By comparing this result to that of Corollary 4.3, we can see that, when the rm cannot commit to its prices, v <
is both a necessary and a sucient condition for it to be optimal for the rm to do some selling as transaction costs become negligible. Recall that, when the rm can commit to future prices, v ≤
is a sucient, but not necessary, condition. Thus, the inability to commit to future prices further restricts the set of valuation distributions for which it optimally sells some units as transaction costs become negligible.
It is of interest to compare the equilibrium prices and marginal usage rates that the rm will set when it can oer both sales and rentals to what these equilibrium values would be under either an exclusive sales or exclusive rental operation. Adapting the notation from Section 4, we denote by r * ,t s and l * ,t s the equilibrium selling price and the equilibrium usage rate of the marginal consumer in period t for the limiting problem in which the rm only sells the durable. In this case, the rm's optimization problem is identical to (5.3-5.4), but with a constraint requiring that p t r ≥v. This constraint implies that, in any period t, there is no future rental income to sacrice when making current sales. Thus, the rm has an incentive to continue to lower the sales price as long as it is above the transaction cost. Thus, the margin, (r * ,t s − c) converges to zero as t approaches innity.
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Next, consider the rental-only rm. In this case, because there are no sales, there are no inter-temporal dynamics, and the rental prices in dierent periods are independent. Because the aggregate usage frequency and the distribution of utilities are time invariant, the optimal rental price is the same in each period, regardless of whether we can commit to it or not.
Thus, the equilibrium rental price in any period t, denoted by r * ,t r , must be identical to the optimal rental price in the commitment case, r * r .
We formalize the comparison between the equilibrium prices for the case in which both sales and rentals can be oered with that in which the rm is constrained to oer either sales or rental alone in the following theorem:
Theorem 5.3. If the rm cannot pre-commit to its selling prices, then its optimal strategy has the following structural properties:
(a) When the rm can engage in both selling and renting, the optimal per-use rental price will be at least as high in each period, t, as the one that it would set when it can only rent its product, i.e. p * ,t r ≥ r * ,t r = r * r , and the inequality is strict whenever Λ > Λ and c < v so that it is optimal to use both selling and renting.
(b) When the rm can engage in both selling and renting, both the limiting optimal usage rate for the marginal consumer and the limiting sales price are both higher than they would be if the rm were restricted to only selling , i.e., λ * ,t ≥ λ * ,t s and p * ,t s ≥ r * ,t s for t suciently large. The inequalities are both strict whenever Λ > Λ and c < v so that it is optimal to use selling as well as renting.
When the rm cannot pre-commit to its prices, we continue to nd that the rental prices are larger when the rm can sell and rent than when it can only rent, and this is true for every time period. In addition, we can see that the marginal usage rates and sales prices in a combined sales and rental operation are eventually higher than those in an exclusive sales operation. Although we have not been able to demonstrate that the relationship between the marginal usage rates and sales prices is true for all periods, we present a numerical example to demonstrate that, in the initial periods, marginal usage rates are higher in the combined operation but that sales prices can be either higher or lower in the combined operation than under exclusive selling. In Figure 4 , we compare the trajectories of marginal usage rates and selling prices between the case in which the rm sells and rents simultaneously and the case in which the rm only sells. As in our previous examples, we set: α = 0.1, c = 0.5, and G follows a beta distribution on [0, 1] with a = 1, b = 0.05, and F follows a uniform distribution with support on [50, 130] . To perform the computations, we discretize the consumer valuations to have a step size of 1 and the consumer usage frequencies to have a step size of 0.001 and N = 100.
In the gure, we observe that p * ,t s < r * ,t s for t ≤ 10 and p * ,t s > r * ,t s for 10 < t ≤ 100, and further that λ * ,t > λ * ,t s for all 1 ≤ t ≤ 100. However, we can also conrm the result from Theorem 5.3 that the limiting sales price is higher under simultaneous selling and renting than under selling alone. Thus, when commitment is not possible, the rm's sales price in any period can be higher or lower than that in the case in which it only sells, and this is analogous to our nding in Section 4. However, without the ability to commit to prices, the limiting sales price will always be higher if the rm sells and rents simultaneously because per-use rentals help to mitigate the eects of time inconsistency by eroding the rm's incentive to reduce selling prices over time.
Discussion
In this paper, we study the trade-os between selling a durable good and renting it on a peruse basis by a monopoly rm. Under per-use rental, a consumer observes her valuation for a particular instance of need for the product before deciding whether to pay for access; whereas under selling, the decision on whether to pay for access is based on the consumer's expected stream of valuations. By proposing a model in which the utility derived from a durable product is stochastic and discontinuous over time, and where consumers are dierentiated according to the frequency with which they experience discrete instances of need, we provide a unied framework to analyze the rm's simultaneous renting and selling operations. Some of the interactions between selling and renting, such as the impact of the rental option on consumers' willingness to pay for a purchase, are missing if per-use renting and selling operations are studied separately, as is the case in existing literature.
Our model allows us to demonstrate the distinct roles that per-usage rentals and selling play in a rm's strategy for price discrimination. While rentals allow the rm to discriminate among the realized valuations at each time instance, sales allows it to discriminate among consumers with dierent expected rates of valuation. Consequently, rms should generally oer both sales and rentals. Specically, per-usage rentals should be oered unless the upper limit of support for valuations is below the transaction cost, while sales should be oered unless the lower limit of support for the valuation distribution is high enough that the rm would rent to all realized valuations. Moreover, these results continue to hold as transaction costs become arbitrarily small or when the rm cannot make a credible commitment to maintain its sales price over time.
Our results provide insights into how prices dier under a combined selling and rental operation from what they would be when either sales or rentals are oered in isolation.
Because sales and rentals are partial substitutes, we oer less of each of them when we oer them simultaneously than when we oer either one in isolation. In our model this corresponds to larger valuations and usage frequencies for the marginal consumers who rent and purchase respectively. Because the rental price is equal to the valuation of the marginal consumer who rents, this naturally corresponds to a higher rental price in the combined operation. However, when rentals are added to a pure selling operation, there are two opposing forces upon the sales price. Because the usage frequency of the marginal consumer increases, there is upward pressure on the sales price. However, the availability of per-use rental increases the consumer's expected utility from not purchasing, and this puts downward pressure on his / her willingness to pay. As a result of these two opposing forces, sales prices can be either higher or lower in a combined operation than in a pure selling environment.
Our results help explain why we observe both selling and renting in the video streaming industry, even though transaction costs are nearly insignicant and rms apparently cannot avoid the temptation to lower prices over time. Of course, the separate roles for per-usage renting and selling in price discrimination exist in more traditional durable goods industries as well, but they would also be inter-mingled with issues related to the utilization of the units of the product that are produced and the possibility that a potential rental consumer could not be serviced due to insucient rental inventory. Appendix A.2 briey discusses how the insights obtained in this paper can apply to systems with such inventory eects, however an in-depth analysis of this topic is left for future study.
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Appendix

A.1 Proof of Results
Without loss of generality, we normalize the market size n to one for the following proofs.
Proof of Theorem 4.2:
Proof. a) Taking the rst derivative of π c λ , p r with respect to p r , we have:
It is easy to conrm from (A.1) that for any value ofλ, we have that 
By dierentiating with respect to p r , we can conrm that v + pr v
increasing in p r . Because this term is positive when evaluated at p r = v, it follows that it will be positive for all p r ∈ [v, v] , and therefore must be positive at p r = p * r . To ensure an interior solution, i.e.,λ * < Λ, we need the right-hand-side of (A.3) be negative. It follows that the right-hand-side of (A.3) will be negative if and only if Λ exceeds a threshold value Λ(p r ), at which the right-hand-side of (A.3) is 0. Thus, Λ(p r ) = αc v+ Proof. Denotingp r = lim c→0 p r , we observe that as c → 0, the right-hand-side of (A.3)
, which is zero whenp r = v and negative forp r > v. In the limit as c → 0, using (A.1), we nd that the condition v < Proof. a) The optimal rental price p * r is the solution to ∂π(λ,pr) ∂pr = 0, where ∂πc(λ,pr) ∂pr is given in (A.1). Therefore, p * r satises the following:
, then the right-side-of (A.4) becomes
. Take derivative of h(λ) with respect toλ, we have dh(λ) dλ
. Deneλ as the solution
. Then, the rst term in the numerator is negative for anyλ >λ. Therefore, dh(λ) dλ < 0 for allλ >λ. In other words,
is increasing inλ for allλ ∈ [λ, Λ]. Due to the IFR property of F (·), it follows that p * r is decreasing inλ for allλ ∈ [λ, Λ].
According to Lemma 4.1, λ * s satises the following equation: 
The left-hand-side of this expression is decreasing by the IFR assumption. The right-handside (RHS) is a linear function ofλ, and must be increasing at the point,λ =λ * (p r ), at which the equality is satised. Note that we have d dpr , and the selling price converges to r * ,∞ s = c as t becomes arbitrarily large.
Proof. Because a consumer's willingness to pay for the purchase of a product is increasing in λ, it is clear that if λ t s is the usage frequency of a consumer who is indierent toward purchasing the product in period t, then all consumers with λ > λ t s will have purchased in or before period t, while those with λ < λ t s will not have purchased.
In each period, t, there exists a marginal consumer, λ t s , who is indierent between buying in period t at price r t s , and buying in period t + 1 at price r t+1 s , i.e.:
There exists an equilibrium price path that satises the following for all t: .6) and in period t = N , the selling price is r
The rm needs to nd the optimal λ N s , in terms of λ * ,N −1 s , to maximize its prot from period N to innity, i.e., it solves the following optimization problem:
Based on the rst order condition, the optimal λ * ,N satises the following equation:
≡ λ * ,∞ s .
Taking limit on both sides of (A.6), we have r * ,∞ s
, the rm will sell a positive quantity in period t.
Proof of Theorem 5.1:
Proof. We will prove part (a) rst, then part (c) and (b). Pick any period t, where 1 ≤ t ≤ N . Part (a): As in the proof of Lemma A.1, at the beginning of period t, the rm faces a market consisting of the consumers with usage rate from 0 to λ t−1 . Consumers with usage rate
(A.9) Part (b): According to (A.9), the sales price in period N is p
The rm needs to nd the optimal λ * ,N , in terms of λ * ,N −1 , to maximize its prot from period N to innity, i.e., it solves the following optimization problem:
Based on the rst order condition, the optimal λ * ,N satisfy the following equation:
= r * r and
. According to Lemma A.1, r * ,∞ s = c and λ * ,∞ s
Thus, we have p * ,∞ s
≥ c = r * ,∞ s and λ * ,∞ ≥ λ * ,∞ s for any r * r ≥ c. As long as Λ > Λ and 0 < c < v, we have r * r > c, and the inequalities are strict.
A.2 Positive Procurement Costs
In this section, we consider the case in which the rm's capacity decision is non-trivial, in particular, each unit of the durable product is procured at a cost w > 0. For simplicity, we assume that there are no lead times associated with procurement. We also focus on the setting in which the rm can commit to its prices. In this case, because there are no procurement delays, there is no stocking decision to make for the rm's sales operation.
Turning to the rental operation, we note that the rm's optimal capacity choice would trade-o between the availability of the product and the procurement costs and rental price.
However, if the market of consumers is suciently large, the eect of variability in the rental demand (between periods) will be negligible compared with the mean demand. In the limiting case in which there is no variability, it would be optimal for the rm to set the capacity of its rental units equal to the mean rental demand in each period. For this limiting case, all analyses in the paper continue to hold, albeit by attributing the procurement costs to the transaction costs. In particular, the cost of each sales transaction is modied to c + w, and the cost of each rental transaction is now c + αw.
The above discussion makes the case that for a large enough market of consumers, the results in the paper continue to hold. We next use numerical experiments to show that for smaller markets, the results are similar. To do so, we restrict attention to the commitment case and consider two specic distributions for λ and V . Following the distribution we used to generate Figure 2 , we assume λ has a uniform distribution on [0, Λ] , and that V has a two-point distribution, i.e., V = V H or V L with equal probability 0.5. In this case, we explicitly allow for each consumer i to experience a need for the product with probability λ i in each period. Let X i be the indicator variable that takes the value one if the consumer makes a rental request in a period, i.e., X i = 1 with probability λ i F (p r ), and 0 otherwise.
Let N be the number of rental requests the rm gets in each period. Then N = is the long run probability that a consumer cannot get a rental unit at the time of her request due to stock-outs.
We use the following parameters in our simulation: unit procurement cost w = 100, discount factor 1 − α = 0.9, V H = 70 and V L = 50. Then we vary the transaction cost c and the maximum usage rate in the market Λ. For each {c, Λ} pair, we calculate the rm's expected prot. We plot the rm's best strategy in Figure 6a and Figure 6b for market size of n = 100 and n = 1000, respectively.
Observe that Figure 5 , the plot we get from ignoring the stochasticity, is nearly identical to Figure 6b in the sense that the rm rents the durable to V H requests only when c ≤c.
In addition, the rm sells the durable only when the maximum usage rate in the market exceeds a threshold (Λ ≥ Λ). Note that for very small Λ, the boundaries between do nothing and rental only and within rental only regions are dierent than those in Figure   2 . The reason is that at very small Λ in a small market (n = 100), the eect of stochasticity of the rental demand on the rm's prot is rather signicant. Ignoring this leads to the overstatement of the rental benet we observed in Figure 2 . However, in a relatively large market (n = 1000), even at small Λ, the eect of stochasticity of the rental demand on the rm's prot is negligible, as illustrated in Figure 6b . In Figure 7 , we show the comparison plots for the rm's optimal decision variablesλ * , the corresponding optimal capacity K * , sales price p * s , and prot π * c for a small market (n = 100) at Λ = 1. Each subplot of gure 7 shows that the analytical results we obtained using deterministic usage rate closely follow the simulation results we get with stochastic rental demand. In short, considering the stochasticity of rental demand that arises in 
